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Restoring realism: Themes and variations 
Ramsey Affifi, University of Edinburgh 
 
Abstract 
In the critical tradition, environmental education discourse interrogates how knowledge 
constructs experience. But environmental education also emphasises perceiving, 
understanding and responding to “more-than-human” beings and processes. These two 
motivations are in tension. One problem is that the epistemological orientation driving the 
critique of knowledge seems to render access to something more-than-human a priori 
impossible. But environmental education squanders its promise and its dream if only ever 
permitted to talk about the natural world with scarequotes. Our field urgently needs to develop 
a realism robust against epistemologies that construct impassable barriers between humans 
and the rest of creation. I propose that this starts with radically reconceiving the nature and 
relationship between similarity and difference, interpreted in this article as the dynamic 
between theme and variations. Reworking Windelband’s distinction between idiographic and 
nomothetic research, I suggest that the relationship between theme and variation manifests a 
fundamental ontological pattern that pervades all things. “Theme and variation” proposes a 
unifying metaphysical duality in which the more-than-human reveals itself in how things 
suggest, conform to, modulate, and violate generalisation. Acknowledging and investigating 
this is part of restoring to other beings and processes their metaphysical, aesthetic, and 
ethical status, from the skies to the psyche.  
 
 
Keywords: idiographic; nomothetic; realism; environmental philosophy; new materialism 
 
Introduction: Light after eclipse 
Many environmental educators are motivated by two aspirations in tension with one 
another. On the one hand, we seek to understand, defend, connect with, relate, listen, and give 
voice to the myriad beings and processes that make up the natural world and help us become 
who we are (a random sample: Fawcett 2000, Bonnett 2004, Russell 2005, Blenkinsop and 
Piersol 2013, Affifi 2015, Barrett et al. 2017, Gannon 2017). As a shorthand here, I call this an 
aspiration for the “more-than-human” (Abram, 1996). On the other, we seek to uncover and 
address the ways human knowing corrupts, controls and denies us access to the world itself 
(Soper 1995, McKenzie 2005a). Experiences engaging the “more-than-human” are easily 
overshadowed by this latter way of thinking. This tension has been recognised and discussed 
for some time (Soper 1995, Stables and Scott 1999, McKenzie 2005b).  
For example, it is easy to frame “more-than-human” as itself a category imposed 
on/by/through experience. This looming shadow is a persisting consequence of the 
epistemological revolution brought about in Kant’s first Critique (2007). Kant argued that when 
we discover necessary and universal aspects of phenomena, we are really only acquainting 
ourselves with how humans inevitably pre-format their experience. We are equipped, he tells us, 
with “faculties” that impose space, time, causality, being, becoming, universality, and the like, 
onto a world that does not necessarily possess these attributes. Although few now believe in 
such faculties, his style of argument has been incorporated widely, from pedagogical theory and 
ethnography to critical theory and postmodernism. For instance, since his time, human reason, 
culture, language, perception, technology, grand narratives, and power have all been said to 
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have just this constitutive role, each allegedly revealing the world only by cloaking it. The spread 
of his self-proclaimed “Copernican revolution” through such varied domains introduced a much 
needed epistemological criticality, ripe with ethical and political consequences. Unfortunately 
however, the overall effect has been disastrous for how we might take seriously our 
understanding of, and relationship with, the nature we ought to cherish, understand, fear, and 
defend. At a historical moment when we need to be paying utmost attention to those beings and 
processes modern globalising culture relentlessly destroys, we are sleepwalking our way into 
the 21st century. How tired we have become of Kant’s isolating trance, the echo chamber, the 
dull anaesthetic! Might we be waking? After the eclipse, might the sun be touching us again, 
and we touching it?   
The first central claim explored in this article is that we cannot escape access to the 
more-than-human. It is within us, providing the conditions for, and continually redirecting, all our 
engagements with phenomena. Just as we come to appreciate that the organisation suffusing 
our mental life owes its existence to our continuous contact with otherness, our allegedly human 
modes of knowing and understanding are themselves just versions of relationships and 
processes that suffuse the natural world. My second claim is that environmental education can 
benefit from these interlocking ideas by explicitly adopting a realist conception of theme and 
variation. My use of the word “realism” is influenced by C.S. Peirce (1935), who drew on 
arguments from the Medieval scholastics such as Duns Scotus. With this tradition, realism 
asserts that universals, that is to say propositions which unify a set of unique particulars by 
identifying common qualities, are not merely the product of a cognising mind. Peirce sought to 
understand haeccity, which consisted in the specific “thisness” of a thing or event. However, 
unlike some influenced by Deleuze, Peirce’s conception does not equate haeccity with some 
raw difference or becoming, contrasted against what can be asserted generally and 
propositionally (e.g. Clarke 2018). Instead, similarity and difference are equally real aspects of 
the presencing of haeccity. I explore their co-presence through a discussion of themes and 
variations, and offer this dialectic as a basis for a restorative realism that can ground and 
support environmental education. 
A restorative realism is consonant with the trend to re-assert the existence and power of 
nonhuman things and processes, constellating under the term “new materialisms” (e.g. 
DeLanda 2002; Barad 2007; Bennett 2009). I argue such a realism offers a better ontological 
foundation for materialism by adding theoretical insight into the relationship between knowing 
and being. While new materialisms sometimes reproduce a Kantian split by favouring unique 
becomings against the human imposition of categorical thinking, I hope to present a realism that 
replaces the dichotomy of humans and world with the unity-through-duality of themes and 
variations, an ontological dialectic that pervades all things. Repetition and difference are co-
present in how themes develop through variations, and equally through variation organising 
thematically. Categorical thinking silences one side of the complementarity, but the solution is 
not to simply rally around the heirs of Heraclitus. 
Such a realism wrests categories from the observer and gives them back to the world. It 
shows that we can track these categories because we emerged through and persist within that 
world. One way of stating this is that matter produces the capacity to track and then respond to 
itself, and one manifestation of this process is in human perception, knowing and activity. The 
Kantian formula, that epistemology logically precedes ontology (expressed most often in the 
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crowds I run with through the vague but world-suffocating phrase “social construction”), is 
flipped, the more-than-human (re)asserted as a force that makes our knowing possible and 
directs the forms it takes (see Affifi 2016a)1. A restorative realism draws humans back into 
continuity and kinship with the world, denying the radical alienation burdened by all who dwell in 
Kant’s shadow. It sees human knowing in any mode (propositional, embodied, aesthetic, etc.), 
as manifesting the same unifying duality in both its form and content because, after all, knowing 
itself is just one set of variations of and within the world’s unfolding theme. Such integrations are 
not new. They have preceded the styles of argument characteristic of “new materialism,” even 
informing “evolutionary psychology” which while crude and politically unsatisfying (e.g. Rose 
and Rose 2001), nevertheless intuits the deep unity between nature and people, between 
matter and mind, and the ontological priority of the former over the latter. “The eternal mystery 
of the world is its comprehensibility,” famously said Einstein (1970), but it is not mysterious once 
we (re)recognise that we are born of the world and ever remade in its images.  
This paper unfolds as follows. I unearth and then rework the relationship between 
nomothetic and idiographic research. I then show that although the thematic element of 
development, sometimes known as generalisation, can dangerous when considered abstractly, 
it is nevertheless essential to the human experience of feeling of connection, kinship and home. 
Its power depends on it not being divorced from the ways in which repetition differentiates itself 
across time and space. I argue that their dynamic unity appears as variations upon themes. In 
subsequent sections, I explore how theme and variation can be interrogated scientifically, 
aesthetically, and pedagogically in an environmental education practice that makes concrete, 
though nonreductive steps to overcome the split between humans and nature.  
 
The nomothetic and the idiographic 
German philosopher Wilhelm Windelband (1894) is responsible for distinguishing 
between two poles of empirical research, which he described as “idiographic” and “nomothetic.” 
His dualism entered Anglo-American psychology by way of a review by J.H. Tufts (1895), and 
was later popularised -and misinterpreted- by Allport (1937). To this day, the terms are usually 
seen as caricatures pitted in sibling rivalry. Against this trend, I argue they are better thought of 
as dialectically interpenetrating, leading to a processual approach that unifies differences across 
space and time, seen clearly through a pair of concepts borrowed from music: theme and 
variation. This has pedagogical significance for environmental education, methodological 
importance for the “post qualitative” inquiry (St Pierre, 2013) growth of knowledge, and 
ontological and ethical value for people and the earth. 
Windelband’s primary aim was to describe the nature of psychology as a science. 
Opposed to the conceptual split between “natural sciences” and “humanities,” he believed 
research is better distinguished on the basis of approach rather than subject of inquiry. 
Windelband noted that when engaging in chemistry, physics, or biology, people often aim at 
“understanding the general lawfulness” (12) to which particular facts conform. He also observed 
that in the study of the origin of language, a legal system, or products of literature or art, 
                                               
1 For Kant, human faculties provided the conditions for the possibility of knowledge. Philosophical 
arguments that seek the conditions for the possibility for something are known as transcendental 
arguments. The realist reversal is also a transcendental argument, maintaining that the more-than-human 
is the condition for the possibility of even Kantian forms of constructivist knowing. 
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scholars are more interested in a “complete and exhaustive portrayal of a particular … a unique, 
temporally circumscribed reality” (ibid). Idiographic research seeks knowledge and 
understanding particular phenomena or events, which in the context of psychology meant 
particular people with particular conditions. Nomothetic research strives to identify general 
characteristics shared across particulars within a sample or a group. Clearly these two 
approaches differed, Winderbrand maintained, but the significant contrast between them lay in 
each’s sharply variant logical assumptions about what constituted “understanding” and 
“knowledge2”. Windelband saw these as two scientific approaches that can fruitfully be 
considered as complementary to one another (Salvatore and Valsiner, 2010). Methods of 
psychiatric intervention attest to the power of such an integration. 
Windelband’s populariser Allport’s intention was to establish the power of, and need for, 
idiographic research, and the ultimate complementarity between it and nomothetic research, 
Unfortunately, his misidentification of nomothetic research with probabilistic quantification 
conspired with the climate of psychological research at that period. By contrast, in Winderband’s 
original formulation, the statistical average across a sample is irrelevant to nomothetic thinking3. 
This is important, not merely because it implied the particular should not cut from regard when 
considering the universal, but because probabilistic thinking makes the notion that categories 
exist in the world seem less palpable. A statistical generalisation seems like a mental construct4, 
especially in the nominalistic epistemological climate inherited from Kant and his predecessors. 
For a nominalist, recurrent properties or qualities that enable us to form categories (for example, 
the universal “dog”) are thought not to exist independently of the human mind. Only unique and 
particular beings or events are seen to actually exist5.  
                                               
2 Transforming Aristotle’s (and then Kant’s (1918)) language, he insisted that the logical difference was 
that one is seeking “apodictic” claims while the other is seeking singular “assertoric” claims. The major 
difference between Windelband and Kant is that Kant used the word apodictic primarily to refer to 
necessary and universal nonempirical knowledge, such as that in mathematics. Winderband’s aim is to 
describe universally and generally repeatable patterns inducted from sets of experience, which is more 
akin to Kant’s (1918) synthetic a priori knowledge. 
3 Windelband is therefore not a precursor to the subsequent distinction in research methods between 
quantitative and qualitative studies. Quantitative studies are not necessarily nomothetic because they 
usually involve ascertaining what is statistically common or significant across a population. This leads one 
to ignore that which does not conform to the general pattern. But nomothetic science is the study of what 
is necessary and universal across all particulars within a population. It is not a science of probability. For 
this reason, qualitative inquiry can be nomothetic, not merely in the case of something like grounded 
theory (e.g. Glaser 1992), but in the common approach to data analysis that codes for themes at the 
expense of paying attention to what is unique across instances. Conversely, there seems no necessary 
reason why numbers or mathematics could not be used in some branches of idiographic study (for 
example, examining a gene mutation’s effects on cellular development might involve considerable 
modelling even if not transferable to other contexts). Quantitative approaches might also be used to 
identify an interesting outlier which can then be explored idiographically. 
 
4 And often is, though increasingly probability seen as a facet of the world and not merely a tool to identify 
generality. 
5 A metaphysical universal refers to common aspects that persists across specific entities independently 
of humans. A logical universal is a universal constructed by knowing. Beings construct logical universals 
in attempts to understand and interact with metaphysical universals. In so doing, variations on 
metaphysical themes emerge. Metaphysical universals are temporally unfolding, and each new instant 
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 Nomothetic approaches acquaint us to necessary and universal, but always implicitly or 
explicitly within a certain span of space or time. Temporally, that span might be microseconds or 
billions of years. The point is only that it aims to grasp something that does not change over 
time for the duration under consideration. Idiographic approaches, on the other hand, acquaint 
us with process, development, and evolution. Spatially, repetition diverges when themes 
emerge in increasingly different contexts, like how bird phenotypes diverge progressively from a 
norm as they approach the limits of their range. If one approach articulates the structure of 
being, the other illuminates the process of becoming.  
All objects of natural science and all human phenomena (e.g. art, relationships, 
thoughts, feelings, understanding) appear regular at one scale but evolve those regularities at 
another. Both aspects are real and unified: becoming births being, while being begets 
becoming. Windelband uses the example of language to make this point, but he might equally 
well have been discussing speciation or some other nonhuman process: at a given moment, 
necessary and universal rules of grammar might be observed for a given dialect of a language. 
But the language also changes over time. If one wants to understand why it changes as it does, 
an historical examination of the many effective contingent factors interacting with one another is 
needed (and only one of these factors is the structure of grammar at a particular moment of a 
language’s evolution).6 
Atoms, molecules, cells, people, trees, thoughts, feelings, planets and galaxies: the 
universe appears categorically, and does so on every scale up to the universe itself, which is 
(by definition) the only singular entity. Classifiable types of things are ubiquitous, intermediates 
between them often lacking. There are no birdcats7 let alone snowflakecats. There are infinite 
possibilities but not all possibilities are possible. The space of possibilities is not a continuous 
field; it is more like Swiss cheese (Dennett 1995) because there are large unexplored or 
unexplorable regions. To assert this is to pushback against constructivisms that elevate the 
ordering power of language (or cognition, or society, or power, etc.) at the expense of allowing 
matter itself the capacity to organise with any degree of inherent complexity. And yet, it is also 
                                               
gives rise to a new version of the type. But the type is a dynamic process. The act of constructing logical 
universals is also a dynamic process. Once constructed, logical universals may appear abstract and 
timeless. This happens when universals are presented as propositions considered in isolation from the 
events that led to them and the ways the proposition might be subsequently altered or overthrown. When 
considered in isolation, a universal appears as a mental construct divorced from the world it emerged 
from and is in ongoing intercourse with. In both the process of generating metaphysical and logical 
universals, the universe is generating themes through each of its variations. For as long as they persist, 
universals can be experienced as themes, in the form of habits, rhythm, relations, and rationality. But 
these themes are themselves susceptible to modification or annihilation, so no universal is truly universal 
outside of specific timescales. The formation of logical universals is itself an ongoing interaction with the 
world. It can take on various characters, from their getting progressively calibrated and reconstructed by 
the resistance of the metaphysical universals, to more transactional encounters, where acting on the 
basis of logical universals changes the very metaphysical universals one is attempting to engage. In any 
case, the outcome is a collaboration, a dynamically performed fusion where the metaphysical and the 
logical home in on one another. 
6 If some set of languages were found to be evolving in some similar way, this would be a nomothetic 
approach to thinking about evolution (the mode of change would not itself change across particulars. But 
one is still able to study each’s unique evolution despite being subjected to whatever common factor). 
7 Of course, there may well be a set of “ bird-cat” relations -the way cats and birds tend to co-evolve 
relationships together. 
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equally clear no two things are the same, whether cells, galaxies, snowflakes, or cats8. Even 
things that appear most similar, like factory made replicants of consumer goods, expose their 
differences when examined closely. There is a continuous copresence of differences and 
repetitions;9 themes varying upon recurrence and variation collecting itself into theme. In heart, 
body, and mind, in particle, and in wave: convention interlaces with queerness; and somewhere 
in the queer, some convention. 
 
The generativity of the general: At home in kinship 
I have suggested that it is metaphysically unhelpful to erect a split between humans and 
the world along epistemological/ontological or general/particular grounds. In this section, I 
explore some existential reasons why repairing these splits under the dynamic unity of theme 
and variation makes sense. I focus on the experience of kinship and home that our experience 
with the general provides. 
Generalization can establish kinship; “all true classification is genealogical” (Darwin, 
1859, p. 420). It shows how things are related, historically and structurally. The similarities that 
enable generalisation owe to common “lineage”, be it conceptual or emotional, phylogenetic or 
physical. Even structural convergences evoke a kind of kinship, one that represents shared 
problems, opportunities and constraints across both the minute and the vast fields of mind, of 
space, and of time. In a Batesonian spirit, we could call these kinships “metapatterns” (Volk & 
Bloom, 2007). We could also call them “themes.” 
Generalisation establishes connection and kinship in several senses. The fact that we 
are able to perceive similarities across instances implies the universe is sufficiently similar to us 
that we can see or feel pattern. It therefore establishes kinship between us -our ways of thinking 
or being.- and the ‘external’ world. Generalisation often works, a sobering point against the 
anthropocentric lavishes of postmodernism. Going further, it is time to acknowledge that all 
organisms categorise, so calling categorisation anthropomorphic is decidedly anthropocentric 
(Affifi 2014a, 2015). Apple trees make the category apple tree through their selective sexual 
engagement with one another. Bacteria treat non-nutritive artificial sweetener “as” sugar and 
mistakenly swim towards it (Stjernfelt 2007). We can participate in the great semiotic process of 
the “world in itself” through paying attention to and honouring classifications that evoke 
ontological interconnection instead of epistemological dissociation. We foster our own and our 
students’ capacities for empathy through helping them identify with others. Even the nonorganic 
world develops habitual patterns and regularities. A very abstracted sort of reasoning might lead 
us to conclude that because any two objects have an infinite number of similar and dissimilar 
qualities, categorisation is therefore indicative more of epistemic limitations or human purposes 
than the things themselves (e.g. Goodman, 1972). This sort of reasoning detaches the human 
intellect from any resonance with the rest of the world, even though it itself emerged through the 
world and in organismic intercourse with it. As such, it withholds our communion and community 
with the cosmos. Peirce observed that nominalism led to a “dreary outlook upon a world in 
                                               
8 in fact, there is currently no evidence that any two atoms of an element are identical. The concept of an 
“equivalence relation” is a useful abstraction, it has never been empirically verified. 
9 In cheeky defiance to trends in new materialism, I am deliberately putting these two words into unison 
without employing them in the way (or through the suite of terms) now becoming doctrinaire (and 
therefore in contradiction to the very evolutionary motivations of the Wizard who first coupled them). 
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which all that can be loved, or admired, or understood, is figment” (Peirce, p. 118, 1909). It is 
against this fracture that we must be emphatic. 
The general also evokes a sense of home, and it is no existential triviality that we desire 
to domesticate (see Affifi 2019). Repetition: the coming back again and again, the stitching of 
the past and the present, the making available again what is now distant, the recurring of 
memories, the stability of friendships and families and places. We have strong psychological 
needs to exist in and cultivate repetition, as the generalizable across space and time 
establishes a sense we are in a world that is our own. In environmental education, whenever we 
call upon tropes such as ecological stability, invasive species, symbiosis, and the nitrogen cycle, 
we are directly appealing to not only a possible nomothetic truth but also to the emotional 
dimension humans experience in the face of nomotheticity. Concepts that work are comforting. 
A terrified child rocks himself to sleep. We feel safe in repetition and often threatened by the 
possibility of losing it. This desire for stability is shared by many in our more-than-human world, 
manifest from nest building to niche construction (Odling-Smee, Laland, and Feldman 2003), 
and from internal to planetary homeostasis (Lovelock 1979). 
Further still, our being at home with ourselves is also born of recognising our own 
patterns. We continue to repeat something of ourselves, that which is in our past self rebirths in 
our current one, it is “who we are” and the nomothetic interpretation of our own nature is 
something we need to establish to feel comfortable and confident as people. As our habits 
become our character (in Dewey’s (1922) terminology) --and one of these habits is indeed an 
acknowledgement and appreciation of the very character that we have become-- we come to 
accept the grammar of our being, the way it houses our experience and makes its own unique 
affordances and possibilities in life’s ongoing development. An epistemological orientation that 
dismisses self-understanding as mere social construction will undercut environmental 
educators’ important work in helping learners contemplate their own complex and contradictory 
habits and responses in the face of the ecological turbulence around us. 
Finally, there is an additional relationship between habits and patterns in the world writ 
large, which is important to bring out in environmental education. Indeed, the habit-forming 
tendency inherent in the world is itself the potential of the world to form nests of stability, 
domesticating itself into contexts that can thereafter offer new contexts for creative variation. For 
example, the settling of our solar system generated a thematic order out of which local forms of 
diversity -such as the storm waves on Jupiter or the methane lakes of Titan- became possible. 
The repetition of day and night provided a generative context that catalysed the blossoming of 
myriad biological forms and behaviours. Our creating habitats in an important sense is just one 
manifestation of the home-making tendency of the changing universe. 
Some of these habits are handed down to us by evolution (e.g. the tendency towards 
instincts and aspects of morphogenetic forms), which demonstrates a coherence between 
organism and environment10. The way an organism predictably depends upon, and contributes 
to, an ecological niche indicates how it is thrown into a regularity generating process (ie a 
theme) that ties it irrevocably to its environment. Gregory Bateson observed (using different 
                                               
10 I do not claim these are preset programmes encoded genetically, which is a homuncular explanation of 
the genesis of information. See Oyama (2000) for a materialist conception of how predictable or common 
“instincts” are repeatedly generated through webs of causal interactions between genes, cells, and 
environments. 
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language than that of this article) that habits (in which “an animal regularly responds to certain 
events with certain actions” 1972, p. 416) track and respond to, but also create regularities in 
the world. In fact, the regularities in the world that life tracks are something like a Moiré pattern, 
as they include the interactional effects of its own behaviour and its environment. This is the 
intimate co-generation of nomothetic stability, where the organism’s ongoing response to 
pattern co-evolves new pattern to which it can in turn respond. Where such habits include the 
capacity of forming new habit (i.e. learning), life continues to reconstruct new dynamics and 
stabilities within the biosphere. This is a startlingly more beautiful and integrated conception of 
the relationship between knowledge and the world than on offer by various anti-realist positions. 
It invites us to actually pay attention to and respectfully engage with those in the world around 
us.  
A ubiquitous co-occurrence of difference and repetition extends to the basic structure of 
the temporal world. For any object to exist, it endures in time -however fleetingly (Hartmann 
1926). But all enduring beings change over time as well. Something in me persists from moment 
to moment, even as my atoms gather together or flee, as cells turn over, even as I learn or 
forget, and slowly age. The tenement building in which I write remains my home (and the 
spiders’ too) while gradually transforming itself through processes of decay. If considered as a 
series of moments, one could easily find a number of characteristics common at various 
intervals of some duration, but also some elements of change. In this sense, all objects exist 
through a continuous variation on a theme. The theme itself may obviously itself transform as 
well, as this paper elsewhere points out. On a foundational level then, the fact of repetition is not 
merely about creating kinships, connections, and stabilities. The possibility of entities and 
identities that can participate in unfolding kinship is being, the repetition of existence itself in 
time. It will be easier to work towards a more prosperous earth once we move beyond our 
various “original sins” and guilt ridden supremacies, and see that even within the very 
perpetuation of a single person’s existence we are carried into each new moment by the same 
dialectic between difference and repetition as all other phenomena. This is a humbling and 
grounding notion, and one that can assist in the personal development needed in tangent and 
dialogue with the broader construction of an ecological society. 
 
Theme and variation: Empirically investigating dynamic unity 
 Categorisation calibrates to pattern. Just as a species’ form and behaviour befits its 
environment, so does its knowledge develop (Plotkin 1994). We “home in” on our home. This 
does not mean that we cannot be vastly wrong about the nature, scope, or value of what we 
gear into, nor that there are not problematic ways of categorising that can do great damage. 
Indeed excessive generalisation often violently erases difference. It becomes sterile, 
monotonous and destructive, suppressing and stifling the wildness within the order it seeks to 
track. Instead of using a category to develop increased intimacy with the world, the category is 
treated as ‘true.’ No longer open to re-examination and leaned upon senselessly, it generates 
hubristic beliefs with humbling consequences. That the modern globalising culture keeps 
making this mistake is evolving into personal, social and planetary tragedy.  
Luckily, it is a metaphysical fact that difference and repetition co-occur. There is 
wildness within every loop. The appropriate response to destructive forms of categorical thinking 
and generalisation is not to vilify these tendencies per se. Generalisations about generalisation 
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can also be violent when they sever intercourse and communion with the thematic tendency of 
the world. Rather than rejecting it, we need to put it in continued dialogue with its perpetual 
dynamical counterpart: contingency, history, complexity, and spontaneity. In doing so, it 
becomes fertile, respectful, and grounding. Life is breathed into the machine. The general is 
generative. In union, we encounter haeccity. 
 Idiographic studies, for their part, give humans a more nuanced and complex 
understanding of the many ways the universe at all its different scales is growing through 
changing. The more we engage in idiographic study, the less we expect things, even clocks, to 
be clocklike. But all idiographic studies require nomothetic knowledge as their ground. 
How is this bullfinch, because of -and now despite- your species-wide predictions? How 
does this person defy your expectations of who she “is”? What does this particular version of 
this theory imply? Asking such questions is relevant and interacts with our capacity to explore 
nomothetic and idiographic questions for several reasons. A more detailed observation 
sameness and difference reveals a fuller scope to variation. A new series of patterns and 
variations unveils.  
For example, examining how a particular wolf in a pack varies from others, might 
uncover many dimensions of her personality. We might begin to see patterns in the way she 
acts, and then how she sometimes varies or violates her own habits. Or, we might zoom out and 
consider her from a broader developmental view, now seeing her patterns as merely temporary 
stabilities. This development may have its own regularities (long sought by developmental 
ethologists) and unique variations as well. Or we might instead focus our eye on the pack itself 
and attend to regularities established and modulated within the social circle at different levels of 
analysis. Considering plants in the field, we witness the fecund interaction between theme and 
variation once again. We can see how different species are similar to one another in a family, 
but also how they vary. We can see how different organisms within a species are similar to one 
another and yet vary as well. Finally, we can investigate themes and variations in the 
component parts of an individual plant, as when we look closely at the progression of leaf 
growth or parts the patterns of leaf venation. Goethean studies (minus the mystical search for 
the Urphenomenon) aim specifically at showing how plant development proceeds, manifesting 
through its variations an unfolding theme (e.g. see Seamon and Zajonc, 1998), seeking to make 
visual the ongoing temporal transformation of leaves. At each stage of the sequence, we see 
how new leaves (and eventually flower parts) are morphological variations of one another, 
showing nomothetic continuity and idiographic novelty uniting sequentially in development. On 
the other hand, D’arcy Wentworth Thompson’s (1942) geometrical transformations of 
organismic form reveal continuities across organisms, illuminating nomothetic kinships between 
organisms within the broader idiographic history of evolution. Such an interplay is again 
observable through interactions between organisms in ecosystems, as they develop and break 
stable expectations of relevant actors in their niches, and on a broader evolutionary scale in 
how variation and change feed into the relational dynamics of interacting organisms through the 
long term genotypic constraints placed on the various organisms’ bodies and behaviours. On 
the other hand, genetics too can be studied in a way that combines the nomothetic and the 
idiographic (e.g. Affifi 2016b). Bateson’s (1979) term “pattern that connects” was meant to 
highlight how myriad manifestations of difference in the biological world offer surprising 
nomothetic dimensions at various “levels” (which he called “logical types”). Themes reappear in 
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varied form at different scales, like a fractal. There are copious possibilities for exploring the 
relationship between idiographic and nomothetic in the lab, forest and field, and math, biology, 
and art can all serve complementary roles in this shared project. Environmental educators have 
countless resources at hand to explore and develop a more intimate and empathetic 
relationship with the more-than-human world. 
I feel a certain empathy develops when I consider how many delightfully entwined 
factors collaborate to bring any being into the world, a feeling which multiplies with the additional 
idiographic insight that each too will perish. Differentiation is inspiring but it also sometimes 
makes us feel vulnerable and precarious (Affifi 2019). A generosity and appreciation of 
difference can also emerge. The birth of all stability and security that we cherish came about 
through the spontaneous generation of novelty as things interact with one another and slowly 
bring the unexpected into form. The evolution of life, like the evolution of the universe as a 
whole, has always depended on difference emerging from within the crucible of regularity.  
This dialectic is present in all evolving process, including the historical development of 
knowledge. For example, nomothetic laws were themselves discovered through unique 
historical idiographic processes (the scientific context of the time, access to funding, the 
researcher’s temperament, etc.), a point that has only become increasingly emphasised since 
Kuhn (1962) injected historicity (in his own lawlike way) into Popper’s (1934; 1963) description 
of the development of science (Feyerband (1975) finished it off with his lawless lawlikeness). It 
is important for students to know that discovery is a contingent and messy, and residues of 
idiosyncrasy persist in any nomothetic framing. This point has been made in science studies but 
can be illustrated through Bateson’s (1979) observation that natural selection was discovered 
independently by both Darwin and Wallace. While ‘the same’ in some sense, the emphasis of 
each varied. Instead of Darwin’s use of Victorian capitalism for his stock of analogies, Wallace 
had a much more cybernetic conception which might have led to different research trajectory in 
biology had he first published his own On the Origin of Species. In other words, each 
nomothetic law will have its own idiographic dimension owing to the particular conditions that 
brought it forth. Recognising Darwin and Wallace as variations of the evolutionary theme is a far 
cry from claiming their ideas are merely socially constructed impositions. Because similar 
discoveries are made repeatedly within and/or between cultures, the differences in their 
inflections can be compared critically without throwing the baby out with the bathwater.  
 
More than human, less than human 
A fruitful approach for inviting the more-than-human back into relation is to consider the 
dynamic between idiographic and nomothetic thinking, unveiling how one leads to deeper 
possibilities of realizing the other. For example, there are certain unique traits only experienced 
once we have already seen the “unique” pattern that binds it with another trait into a generalised 
type. This uniqueness in turn enables us to perceive levels of generality too nuanced for an eye 
not sensitised to the unique dimension afforded by the even earlier generalisation.  
In other words, without acquainting ourselves with the theme, we cannot experience or 
understand its various manifestations. But witnessing the uniqueness thus revealed opens up 
our minds to other more subtle regularities. This is the developmental unity of theme and 
variation, a unity that pervades all phenomena inside and out, and that is the condition for the 
possibility of knowing in the first place. If nomothetic and idiographic approaches take the form 
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of focusing on general and the particular respectively, it is only because both aspects exist in 
the more-than-human. Once recognising all snowflakes have six sides, we are perceptually 
honed to each flake’s freewheeling upon this rule. In other words, categorising, classifying, and 
generalising need not insulate us in epistemological bubbles. Nor need they be hitched to a 
“metaphysics of mastery” out of which a poetic orientation towards otherness is the only escape, 
as often seems explicitly or implicitly suggested (e.g. Bonnett 2004, Mcphie and Clarke 2015). 
Categories can -and should- create the conditions for their own elaboration or overthrow. As 
Dewey might put it: objects object to our schemes. Conversely, idiographic studies invite, 
indeed depend on, consideration of universals and repetitions. Even when we engage a single 
entity, let’s say my Uncle John, seeking to understand, describe, or relate with “who” he is, we 
will inevitably come upon patterns and regularities in his character. (Some colleagues keep 
disagreeing with me on this point). Likewise, an autobiographical study will not focus on 
ceaseless change and historical becoming per se. It will recognise that human development 
settles into stabilities which persist over time, and that change is only significant when 
considered in reference to these stabilities. Idiographic inquiry will not get very far if it does not 
establish or rely on categories.  
It is somewhat sublime to consider that all across the universe idiographic processes 
give rise to repeatable patterns, just as surely as these patterns in turn originate differences. 
The emergence of repeatable mass-based interaction (let’s call it “gravity”) somewhere around 
the 10^ -36 seconds after the big bang, gave rise to the phenomenon of galaxies. The evolution 
of our species, our cultures, and our individual lives cooperate in dazzling ways to bring about 
the elaboration, disruption, and description of regularities. The more-than-human world is made 
up of repeating differences and differentiating repetitions across space and time. When we 
speak of epistemological constructions placed upon the world (and thereby veiling it), in the 
Kantian (through to postmodern) tradition, I suggest such epistemologies result from splitting the 
primordial dynamic unity of these terms. On their own, both are abstractions: less-than-natural, 
less-than-human. The nomothetic abstraction, for its part, is dangerously platonic. It considers 
the common trait as more real (or at least more “valuable”) than the particularities of individual 
instances. If we only look for or see the lawlike and eternal, we indeed impose a version of the 
world onto it. Conversely, pure idiographic abstraction ignores internal order, genealogy, and 
the ways the world domesticates itself, setting upon the world a version of things liquidated of 
the depths it intends to plumb. In solitude, neither can adequately respond to nor engage with 
how the world produces and destroys its themes and variations at various spatiotemporal 
scales. But this is the challenge we face. 
 
The aesthetic experience of theme and variation 
While mass production inadvertently teaches that variation is defect, (a lesson magnified 
in reach as we increasingly live in a technologised world), the variation of rocks and trees, of 
people and artisanal handicrafts, is needed more than ever as its (de)stabilising agent. Humans 
are nourished by examples of where the differences among repetitions are fruitful, soulful and 
healthy, and not the undesired breakdown of precise engineering gone wrong. We are 
nourished when freedom and spontaneity seem to work --something in us feels these as deep 
ongoing murmurations of a living universe. As educators, we need to introduce the regularity of 
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irregularity back into experience. A continued practice of acquainting with the living world 
provides the antidote. 
Idiographic knowledge is not just a set of specific historical propositions in the sense 
described above by Windelband. It does not necessarily, include an examination of the relevant 
factors that contributed to the genesis of a thing. There is also an “aesthetic” encounter with 
uniqueness. This is the event of experiencing a thing in immediate encounter as it arises. It is an 
important moment in the way humans can engage with phenomena and important for 
environmental educators to seek ways of provoking such experiences. But it is not necessary to 
create a hierarchical scheme that values this as in some way authentic against other moments 
when humans compare and relate the self-arising being with other things (as Bonnett (2004) 
seeks to do). Part of its self-arising is its manifesting similarity and relationality with what is 
beyond it. That a focus on regularity has been capitalised on by the desire for mastery does not 
imply the regularity is any less a real or important part of a being’s haeecity than its immediate, 
singular presence. In fact, perception itself is categorical prior to thinking (Merleau-Ponty 2012). 
The sensory is not the antidote to the allegedly detached generality of the rational (as Abram 
1996 would have it). They interpenetrate profoundly in the developmental genesis of perception 
itself. Moreover each is aesthetically imbued with both themes and variations.  
And indeed, the aesthetic experience of such self-arising depends on the dialectic between 
theme and variation. Whether silk woven in Laos, African masks, pentatonic Chinese melodies, 
Mayan ceramics, or coloured glass windows in Gothic churches, art across the world’s varied 
cultures interplays symmetries and modulations, as well as transformations of those 
symmetries. In so doing, each bears a structural resonance deeper than any mimicry with how 
one spinal cord bone is related to the next, and all in turn with the trees in a forest which vary 
stochastically in height and yet not without discernible pattern. 
Unfortunately, as with the split between knowing and world, modern perspectives have 
also rendered aesthetic experience “subjective.” Not only have aesthetically important beings 
and processes suffered as a result (beauty merely in the eye of the beholder can’t be mobilised 
for in defense), but a potent and visceral way of experiencing the more-than-human is driven 
into irrelevance. While I do not suggest that there is only one valid type of aesthetic experience, 
I maintain that aesthetic encounters can connect us affectively with the sorts of difference and 
repetition we have so far considered only from a “cognitive” point of view. And I suggest humans 
cannot flourish in anesthetic conditions where contexts repeat with variations hidden, or within 
randomness bereft of regularity. The precisely laid out stonework of modern city floors is 
unsatisfying because it minimises and thereby buries the “variations on a theme” that is the 
ongoing consummation of all phenomena, and that which cobblestones of former days made so 
manifest. Conversely, a non-musician randomly banging at a piano produces insufficient 
recurrences for their spontaneity to plumb the heart. Neither enigma nor profoundity are 
sacrificed by restoring unity to the general and the specific. By providing a context and a 
horizon, such a unity is the ground for experiencing both meaning and mystery.  
A language accumulates new vocabulary and idioms when it is responsive to 
immediacy, its codes and conventions contorted by local people and place. By its very evocative 
power a novel turn of phrase spreads, integrating into the code itself, and eventually devolves 
into cliché; the anarchist ascends to the authority (notice what has happened to many Deleuzian 
terms). When the variation becomes the theme, however, it sets the conditions for its own 
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rupture. Becoming is scarcely steady uniform change. It has its own differences and repetitions, 
and we are aesthetically attuned to it for the simple reason that it is also part of our very own 
learning, growth, and transformation. It is felt in bones before brains.  
 Once recovered from anthropocentric subjectivity, an aesthetic elicitation is revealed as 
a valuable and essential dimension of research, pedagogy and environmental practice. By 
severing ourselves from the world we also sever different parts of ourselves from each another. 
We aesthetically experience the unification of difference and repetition before we isolate either, 
and yet examining each in turn, and how they participate in the unification, we can bring about 
new aesthetic experiences.  
Why do the particularities of a great story or painting touch many people? We do 
theories and observations about one aspect of the world serve as insightful analogies to 
understand other parts? This laterality, how the specific transcends itself and points to the 
general, makes growth possible. Lateral analogies play a major part in explanation and 
discovery (Hofstadter and Sander, 2013), local ecological knowledge, and art. They are crucial 
in hypothesis formation (e.g. Peircean ‘abduction’ (1935)), active observation and 
experimentation, and educators should directly encourage analogic transdisciplinarity. It is 
ultimately more worthwhile to develop one’s capacity to see possible lateral kinships and to 
investigate them than to passively accept as dogma received laws concocted by others, which 
kidnap our sensory engagement with the evolving world. In other words, pedagogies that teach 
generalisation as a reified entity divorce the student from the necessary developmental unity of 
theme and variation. But lateralisation also offers the important existential dividend of stitching 
our identity back into relationship with other people and nature. Everything is therefore full of 
secret lessons. I could study a single stalk of thyme for the rest of my days and it would surely 
show me insights into the most unexpected things. Analogies ultimately get tweaked by the 
contexts they describe or engage, as any variation must (Affifi 2014b). The generalisation gets 
regeneralised through the specific. We are of a great intertwining fractal, with similarities, 
kinships and homologies abounding. So it is that humans participate and can identify in this 
grand process of generating and varying themes, our knowledge projects flowing from and 
wrapping back into the world from which they birthed and forever abide. 
 
Restoring realism in environmental education 
We can provoke students when their nomothetic frames deaden their experience of the 
world. General categories that explicitly deny a role to freedom, randomness, spontaneity, or 
creativity, are dangerous, especially when they are self-validating (Weston 1996). For example, 
the mutually buttressing beliefs that other organisms are merely repeating their genetic tunes 
and that their songs are not worth listening to anyway, can hardly promise experiences for 
students that could undermine these premises. Teachers need to be on the lookout. When 
humans excessively value the nomothetic, an important ethical shift occurs. The dominance of 
nomothetic thinking leads inexorably to the dominance of people and of nature. Disproportionate 
focus on nomothetic knowledge sabotages the power and beauty it promises to reveal, 
squandering the kinship and connection it gifts us. When used to discriminate, to ignore, and to 
create scales of value, generalisation divides rather than unites (Plumwood 1993). But it is a 
dangerous error to equate generalisation with such tendencies, severing generalisation’s 
connective capacities. Instead we must heal the nomothetic by bringing it back into ongoing 
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intercourse with the nomothetic. Rather than erecting absolute barriers (in a too common Sapir-
Whorfian vein) or dissolving otherness through some colonial unity, a person versed in 
understanding and exploring the ongoing collaboration of difference and repetition might work 
through a more responsive and attentive ongoing process. For example, American bird experts 
and Itza’Maya ways of classifying birds converge (Bailenson et al. 2002). The differences and 
similarities between them matter. For anyone in sustained, meaningful engagement with birds, 
certain ways of conceiving suggest themselves. Both ways of conceptualising are thematic 
variations of bird diversity itself. Their similarities show we live in a common world, their 
differences show that this world reveals itself in varied ways depending on the particular 
practices we sustain. Bird classification is only arbitrary for rookies without any robust care or 
involvement.  
As mentioned, for Peirce (1935), the term “realism” hinges on the idea that 
generalisations are not merely structures imposed on the world in the sense we have come to 
think about knowing ever since Kant (1918). Peirce took aim at an attitude that persists in 
environmental education. The “nominalists” of his time argued that the universe is made up 
solely of particulars and any categorisation or classification but a construct. Many environmental 
educators distrust classification today and with van Matre’s (1990) book in hand, have their 
students focus on the unique organisms (aka. “Beings”, “Others”, “Voices”) they encounter on 
field trips. The entities encountered are thought so delicate that any move to classify them 
immediately and irreparably bludgeons intimacy or relationship (e.g. Bonnett, 2004). While I do 
not discount the need to focus on particularity, the prejudice against universals is 
counterproductive. It prevents some of the very intimacy it seeks to nurture. As my discussion of 
idiographic and nomothetic inquiry has shown, either can be engaged for diverse purposes, 
conventionally scientific or propositional, aesthetic, participatory or embodied. But when the 
idiographic and nomothetic are combined in earnest, the distinction between seemingly 
embodied and disembodied forms of knowing begins to dissolve. Rather than paradigms 
existing worlds apart, they are seen as moments in an ongoing process. We fall in and out of 
experiencing thisness and whatness, haeccity and quiddity. This is not only unavoidable, it is 
desirable. Environmental education will restore “the environment” into pedagogy only once it 
reconciles the epistemological, ontological, aesthetic, and ethical rifts that split the human from 
the world. This calls for new realisms perhaps even before any new materialisms. Tacking the 
dialectic between sameness and difference is one way we can encounter and engage with the 
world itself, in song and in love, within and without. The more than human and the human alike 
reveal themselves through dialectical process. 
And how we engage our students too. If I were to repeat the phrase “variations on a 
theme” over and over again in this paper, or the same idea but simply change the words, I 
would not keep true to the organic development of thought or the world. I would also quickly 
lose your attention. That we are aesthetically affected by the fertility of the universe implies that 
our writing and our lessons should also be developmental, exposing and embracing convention 
stirred by circumstance. In educational contexts, when teachers focus on pedagogies that are 
“evidence based,” this often means that they “work” for some statistically significant number of 
students. Those on the edges of the bell curve are sacrificed for expediency. Sometimes, 
violence is not against certain students but against certain aspects of individual students. A 
child’s most common features are considered and engaged while her less common variations 
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are ignored. This is a violation of the whole child. At best, these examples mimic that form of 
democracy known as “as tyranny by the majority,” at worst, well, you can imagine.  
One article reviewer pointed out that this dialectic is “self-evident” in any competent 
environmental education programme. In some sense, this is true –even in the most incompetent 
ones. Humans cannot help but think in nomothetic or idiographic ways. However, as far as 
learning intentions that explicitly inform practice, I am afraid I cannot agree that their harmony 
has been pedagogically satisfying. Instead, I find a haphazard and unreflected-upon melee of 
both modes. Adding to the confusion is the implicit denial of a necessary complementarity, with 
practitioners often dividing rather sharply along a line. One camp provides learning that focuses 
on categories, naming and identifying species, behaviour, and ecological processes. Adherents 
usually consider contemplating an individual’s uniqueness as having limited value (“accidents” 
or “noise”). By contrast, the other camp distrusts the categorical impulse, arguing that it is 
distancing, perhaps patriarchal and colonial, and detracts from our capacity to really listen and 
to sensitively respond to the particular others all around us (e.g. Bonnett 2004, Blenkinsop and 
Piersol 2013, Mcphie and Clarke 2015). Underlying philosophical commitments funnel practice 
in one way or another. The space between Kant’s constructivist shadow and the light of the 
more-than-human is vast, but we do not yet have the wings for it. 
 
An evening sea 
 Consider waves in the sea, gathering through the transfer of energy from wind to water. 
While the waves are separated in space and time, they have a consistency of form which owes 
to shared conditions that brought them forth. But look more closely at the surface of the waves. 
You will see differences on each of them. Perhaps you notice new patterns maintained on the 
skin of the water, the calligraphy of local gusts. But these “capillary waves” also fluctuate one 
from another, in even more shortly lived variations than those undulations that they tickle and 
smudge. In each case, we see that what repeats has a momentum carried into the current 
interaction from distant places and times. Indeed, a “community of descent is the hidden bond” 
(Darwin, 1859, p. 420), but at each moment, that which modifies without eliminating the 
repeated rule is always the causal effect of things happening at a more local spatiotemporal 
scale. We can guide students in experiencing and interpreting the overlapping fossils of different 
time scales present in the Moiré patterns all around us. The “sameness” of two maple trees 
owes to their shared phylogeny, their differences to more recent genetic or ontogenetic 
conditions. A river wears out a canyon but varies moment to moment in how it tumbles through 
its ridges and banks. The long developing character of my personality has a strong habituating 
influence on my capacity to reinvent myself now, though local conditions elicit flexibility. Finally, 
the ideas taking shape in this article, confined to increasingly narrow domains of creativity as 
what comes before lays out demands for coherence and consistency, slow but never stop the 
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